How England’s National Identities Are Planning To Vote?

With three by-elections on Thursday and more in the pipeline, I thought it would be interesting to look at how national identity in England is reflected in current voting intentions. The two decades from 2000 saw a marked polarisation of voting by national identity[1]. Even in 2001, English identifiers were more Conservative than other identity groups, but Labour still one the larger share of their votes. In subsequent general elections those more English trended further towards the Conservatives. By 2019, Boris Johnson was able to win 68% of the ‘more English than British’[2], while Corbyn’s Labour won amongst the ‘more British’[3]. In between those elections, English identifiers were the driving force behind the rise of UKIP and the Brexit Party in European and local elections and were decisive in the Leave victory.

England’s national identity groups are not distinct tribes, of course, but their position on the Moreno scale does correlate broadly with the demographics of age, higher education, and diversity, with socially conservative and socially liberal values (including on immigration), and with views of national sovereignty and democracy. There is little difference between identity groups on economic values. National identities reflect different world views and values and can be mobilised when the right issues are high on the agenda. After 2001 combination of strong views of national sovereignty and a desire to control immigration enabled the mobilisation of English identifiers around an increasingly Eurosceptic politics.

A big question for those who focus on national identity (let’s be honest, a lot of academics ignore English national identities entirely) has been whether the polarisation would persist if other issues dominated the political agenda. (There is much less difference between identity groups on economic values). The cost-of-living crisis and the dire state of public services are now much more prominent. Issues of immigration and sovereignty are kept alive by small boats and rows about the ECHR, but nothing provides the simpl(istic) solution Brexit once appeared to offer.

New polling from YouGov commissioned by the Centre for English Identity and Politics sheds some light on the new electoral map. In common with most current polling, it shows a strong Labour lead.[4]

Break the same polling down by identity groups and a marked divergence appears. Labour is ahead of the Conservatives amongst all the identity groups other than the ‘English not British’. But those emphasising their English identity are much less likely support to Labour, while those who emphasise Britishness or who have no British or English identity give strong support to Labour.[5]

It’s interesting to compare this recent data with a similar poll conducted in the run-up to the local elections in 2022.

This showed a smaller Labour lead, and when broken down by national identity group, the same skewed pattern is apparent.

The more significant changes in the last year took place at the ‘English end’ of the scale and reflect a fall in Conservative support as much as an increase in Labour support. Amongst the ‘English not British’ Conservatives support fell 21%, from 54% to 35%, while the Labour shared remained static on 27%. Amongst the ‘more English than British’ Conservative support fell 26%, from 54% to 28%, while Labour gained a modest 5% share, from 28% to 33%. Amongst the Equally English and British, the Conservatives lost 11%, falling from 41% to 30% and Labour gained 8% to reach 44%.

Between 2022 and 2023 support for Reform rose from 9% to 16% amongst the English identifiers; from 4% to 15% amongst the more English than British; and from 3% to 8% amongst the equally English and British. (This is in line with a presentation Prof Ailsa Henderson gave to a recent CEIP webinar showing that 2019 Conservative switchers were more likely to go to Reform if they were English identifiers and to Labour if they were British identifiers). Although excluded from the charts above, the raw data also shows those saying they won’t vote or don’t know rising from 31% to 37% amongst English not British, and from 17% to 38% amongst the more English than British. (The changes amongst other groups are much smaller).

A comparison of the recent 2023 polling with the outcome of the 2019[6] election shows the extent to which Labour has gained amongst all identity groups. Nonetheless, Labour support amongst English emphasisers remains well below their support amongst the other groups.

The alignment between English emphasisers and the Conservative Party that was so apparent in 2019 seems much less secure. The lead Labour has established since 2023 also owes as much Conservative losses as to Labour’s own gains.

The persistence of polarisation by national identity may partly reflect the historic tendency of English identifiers to be less supportive of Labour. Party alignments established over two decades may have a lingering influence on the rejection of Labour. It may also be that concerns about migration, social conservative values and a strong sense of national sovereignty may remain important to the English section of the electorate. While the Conservative Party can no longer mobilise them effectively, Labour still struggles reach many.

There is one further twist to this story. The Conservative Party ‘s ability to mobilise Leave supporting English identifiers was not clear even a few weeks ahead of the 2019 election. Polling conducted for the CEIP 16 days before election day showed strong support for the Brexit Party amongst English identifiers.

Through the previous two decades a growing section of English identifiers had switched between the Conservatives (and to a lesser extent Labour), UKIP and the Brexit Party depending on the election and who was seen as the standard bearer for Euroscepticism. In the event, the Brexit Party did not stand in Labour held seats in 2019 and the Tory appeal to ‘Get Brexit Done’ won over many other potential Brexit Party supporters.

There is clearly some potential for the Conservatives to win over Reform supporters at the next election and to outperform their current polling. There are fewer votes in play, the Conservatives do not have such a clear-cut offer to Eurosceptics, Reform is now the recipient of disillusioned Conservatives, and Labour has worked to keep Brexit off the political agenda.

The remaining polarisation will have a differential impact on constituencies. In some places –smaller towns and villages with older, less university educated and less diverse populations — the presence and influence of the English voters will be greater. If Labour’s poll leads narrows and some Tory defectors can be persuaded to return some seats may be more marginal than national polling would suggest.

John Denham

(First posted 16.7.23. on TheOptimisticPatriot)

Note: All polls conducted by YouGov for the Centre for English Identity and Politics at Southampton University. 27.6.2023; 21–22.4.2022; 2–3.12.2019

[1] as measured by the Moreno scale from English not British, through more English than British etc to British not English.

[2] English not British plus More English than British

[3] More British than English plus British not English

[4] The data excludes Don’t Knows and Will Not Vote, but has none of the adjustments for turnout, distribution of DKs etc used when trying to predict election results. We are interested here in underlying attitudes.

[5] The identity groups are not all the same size. In the 2023 poll, 15% English not British; 12% more British than English; 41% equally English and British; 10% more British than English 12%; British not English; 7% Other and 4% Don’t Know, making the equally English and British the larger than either the English or British emphasisers.

[6] Simplified to ‘more English’, ‘equally English and British’ and ‘more British than English’